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In a recent article, Ned Markosian gives an argument against the Spacetime
Thesis, namely the view that “time is one of four similar dimensions that make
up a single manifold that is appropriately called spacetime” (Markosian, 2019,
p.1). The argument proceeds by considering a series of seven notes played out
in time and constituting a melody. Markosian asks us to imagine a rotation of
the series of notes in spacetime, resulting in the seven notes being played out
at the very same time. Markosian points out that those notes will lose their
aesthetic value. According to him, this Argument from Sideways Music shows
that time cannot be identical with other spatial dimensions, as the aesthetic
value of entities populating reality cannot survive a rotation mixing up space
and time—unlike rotations taking place in and only in space, that preserve the
aesthetic value of the rotated entity.
Whether or not the argument is correct is irrelevant to a broader con-
cern. The concern is that Markosian attacks a straw man since the Argument
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from Sideways Music targets a theory known to be false on empirical grounds,
that I will label “defective four-dimensionalism” and that may not be seriously
considered as an interesting version of four-dimensionalism. Defective four-
dimensionalism is the view that the time dimension is identical with the three
spatial dimensions in all respects. I label this view as “defective” because the
view is essentially flawed and does not correspond to four-dimensionalism as
defended by its proponents. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived, on the con-
trary, acknowledges the existence of a distinction between space and time.
I disagree with Markosian on three points. First, four-dimensionalism as he
defines it (the “Spacetime Thesis”) does not correspond to four-dimensionalism
as defended by its proponents. Second, the Spacetime Thesis is flawed by being
at odds with modern physics. Third, the two reasons given by Markosian to
worry about four-dimensionalism rightly conceived can easily be addressed.
First, the Spacetime Thesis as he defines it does not correspond to the stan-
dard four-dimensionalist view. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived relies on
the existence of a distinction between space and time. The B-theory describing
time as intrinsically orientated—with the systematic orientation of phenom-
ena being a primitive aspect of temporal relations—is a very popular form of
four-dimensionalism (see e.g. Kajimoto, Miller, and Norton forthcoming). Fur-
thermore, even assuming an alternative block universe view stating that the
orientation of time is extrinsic to time (as with the C-theory of time) by de-
pending on for instance laws of nature or the distribution of matter in space-
time, the view acknowledges the existence of a difference in the world between
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spatial and temporal directions. Therefore, the two most popular kinds of four-
dimensionalism (the B-theory and the C-theory) do make a difference between
spatial and temporal directions in the four-dimensional block and, consequently,
are not affected by Markosian’s argument.
Actually, this distinction between space and time is to be found in all physical
theories, a fact that motivates my second point of disagreement with Markosian:
defective four-dimensionalism is inconsistent with contemporary physics. In-
deed, it is generally assumed (correctly to my mind) that contemporary physics
strongly suggests four-dimensionalism, namely a package of views about the
flow of time (a B- or C-theory rather than an A-theory), temporal existence
(eternalism rather than presentism or no-futurism) and perhaps about the cross-
temporal identity of material objects (perdurantism or the stage theory rather
than endurantism).1 However, the very same physics also signals the existence
of a local split between space and time, establishing a difference between spa-
tial and temporal directions (see Callender 2017 and Le Bihan and Linnemann
2019).
1I use the expression “strongly suggests” rather than “logically entails” because there exist
research programs in physics at an early stage of development which seem consistent with 3D
ontologies (as with shape dynamics; see e.g. Gomes et al. 2011) or growing block approaches
(as with the causal set theory; see e.g. Dowker 2006 and Wu¨thrich and Callender 2016).
Furthermore, there exist hybrid views such as the moving spotlight theory combining an A-
theory with a four-dimensionalist picture. Here I am simply stating that four-dimensionalism,
generally regarded as the most natural reading of relativistic physics, even when understood
as denying the existence of a flow and direction of time, acknowledges the existence of a
difference between space and time.
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Indeed, if we look at modern physics, we may distinguish between two parts
of the discipline: physics that is empirically well-established and constituted
from distinct and prima facie incompatible theories—general relativity and
quantum field theory—and speculative research programs aimed at the elab-
oration of a broader, in some sense more fundamental, framework—labelled
“quantum gravity”, which aims to describe phenomena that are both quantum
and gravitational (in particular black holes, the earlier instants of the universe
and the deep fabric of spacetime). The most promising approaches to quantum
gravity at the moment are string theory and loop quantum gravity. A generic
feature of approaches to quantum gravity is that they seem to entail the emer-
gence of spacetime as described by our most fundamental theory of spacetime,
namely general relativity, by a non-spatio-temporal structure (see e.g. Huggett
and Wu¨thrich 2013 and Lam and Wu¨thrich 2018). In this context, Le Bihan
and Linnemann (2019) have recently examined which properties of spacetime
are denied reality to. They found that a local distinction between space and
time2 is not one of those properties. That distinction always appears, in some
way, not only in empirically well-confirmed contemporary physics (in particular
in special and general relativity, our two most fundamental theories of spacetime
at the moment), but also in virtually all approaches to quantum gravity.
Importantly, this local distinction between space and time need not have
anything to do with time exhibiting a flow or an (intrinsic or extrinsic) orien-
2Or to use their terminology, between “quasi-space” and “quasi-time” if features which are
regarded as essential to the existence of space and time are missing in the more fundamental
quantum theory of gravity.
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tation. There is another, deeper (i.e. logically anterior), more neutral way to
distinguish between space and time. This distinction is encoded in the (local)
Lorentz symmetry of our best physical theories to date (namely the general
theory of relativity and the standard model for particle physics) and in many
approaches to quantum gravity.3 Lorentz symmetry is a particular sort of sym-
metries which constrains the way physical systems can be transformed. These
so-called Lorentz transformations necessarily mix to some degree the temporal
coordinate of the system with at least one of the three other spatial coordinates
thereby signaling that spacetime must be, in some sense, more fundamental than
space and time. However, and this is the crucial point to appreciate, these trans-
formations cannot mix quantities of space with quantities of space only—leaving
time out of the story. A set of special directions within spacetime, labelled as
“time”, must always be part of any physically meaningful transformation. So
when we consider Markosian’s thought experiment, we should not regard it as
presenting us with a rotation of a physical system (from a particular state to
another state) but rather as a transformation of a physical system into another
physical system in a way which is inconsistent with the laws of physics.4
In brief, there is no doubt that physical theories indicate the existence of a
3Some approaches of quantum gravity such as the causal set theory do not seem to embed
Lorentz symmetry but they nonetheless rely on a different diachronic principle distinguishing
between space and time. See Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019).
4Furthermore, the very idea of a four-dimensional rotation is also problematic at a con-
ceptual level as it seems to require a second-order time to make sense of the substitution of
a four-dimensional system (including first-order time as one of its dimensions) by another
four-dimensional system (including the very same first-order time as one of its dimensions).
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difference between space and time. A small caveat here is that this separation is
only local in the context of general relativity as the reference frames themselves
are only local in general relativity; a set of special directions nonetheless always
exist locally. Having said that we still have no explanation about the source of
the difference though, as we only have a mathematical representation of it. This
situation is consistent with two distinct metaphysical interpretations. Either
the local split between space and time is an intrinsic feature of spacetime, or
it is an extrinsic feature of spacetime, inherited from its material content or
from some laws of nature evolving this content. As a result, and although
we do not know with certainty what the actual source of the distinction is in
terms of metaphysical categories (laws, dimensions, etc.), we must nonetheless
acknowledge its existence.
However, and this is a subtle point to appreciate, the distinction between
space and time does not entail that they should be regarded as two distinct
manifolds. Modern physics entails or, at the very least, strongly suggests that
we live in one four-dimensional manifold. One might object to this spacetime
unitism that spacetime separatism,5 namely the view that there exist two dis-
tinct manifolds, the three-dimensional spatial manifold on the one hand, and
the one-dimensional temporal manifold on the other hand, can be made sense
of by subscribing to an ontology of spatial hyper-surfaces absolutely ordered by
an empirically undetectable absolute time, namely by dropping the assumption
of the relativity of simultaneity. Nonetheless, as Baron (2018, 9) points out,
5I borrow this terminology from Gilmore et al. (2016).
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it is far from clear that it would be possible to extend this unnatural interpre-
tation to general relativity (see also Gilmore et al. 2016, 103-105). Spacetime
unitism, with its unified four-dimensional manifold and metric straightforwardly
generalise to general relativity. What it means is that space and time seem to
be mere abstractions as there is no unique and obvious way to slice spacetime
into three-dimensional hyper-surfaces.6 Therefore, relativistic physics seems to
suggest both spacetime unitism and the existence of local differences between
temporal and spatial directions within the spacetime manifold.
I now come to my third point of disagreement with Markosian. He raises two
issues against the sort of four-dimensionalism that posits the existence of a dif-
ference between the three spatial dimensions on the one hand, and the temporal
dimension on the other hand—namely, against the view that I identify as four-
dimensionalism rightly conceived. As we have seen, four-dimensionalism should
be understood as positing the existence of a four-dimensional manifold in which,
locally, there actually is an ontological difference between spatial and temporal
directions. Keeping in mind this important refinement of four-dimensionalism,
let us look at the two alleged issues.
6One might point out that we find a cosmic time in scientific cosmology, and that there
is a most natural way to slice the observable universe into three-dimensional hyper-surfaces
allowing us, for instance, to attribute an age of 13.8 billion years to the universe. This is
true of course but, although this slicing is natural on cosmic scales, it nonetheless depends on
the contingent distribution of matter in spacetime and more importantly, it is a mere global
approximation that does not take into account the local curvature of spacetime due to massive
bodies. See e.g. Smeenk (2013) and Wu¨thrich (2013).
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According to Markosian, four-dimensionalism rightly conceived is not at-
tractive because it is a middle position that lacks the elegance (i.e. simplicity)
of defective four-dimensionalism and the intuitiveness of the dynamic theory of
time. However, it does not seem correct to ignore scientific data and use elegance
and intuitiveness as the only guiding principles when addressing metaphysical
matters. Four-dimensionalism rightly conceived might be a complex view lack-
ing the simplicity of defective four-dimensionalism, and a counter-intuitive view
lacking the immediate intuitiveness of the dynamic view; but this is the most
straightforward way to read modern physics, which results of a long theoretical
work to make sense of surprising empirical results. Note that the problem here
is not the appeal to the simplicity of defective four-dimensionalism or to the
intuitiveness of the dynamic view; the problem is to ignore a third theoretical
virtue that should not be ignored: consistency with contemporary science in
general, and modern physics in particular. And when we include consistency
with modern physics as a legitimate criterion for theory selection in metaphysics,
the middle position turns out to be an appealing position. (Furthermore, one
might take a step further and remark that consistency with scientific data as a
methodological virtue should be more important than intuitiveness or beauty,
thereby offering a reasonably good argument in favour of four-dimensionalism.)
Let us now consider Markosian’s second argument against four-dimensiona-
lism rightly conceived:
For whatever small differences are posited between time-like dimen-
sions in the manifold and merely space-like dimensions will presum-
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ably not be enough to account for the great difference in aesthetic
value between normal music and sideways music. (Markosian, 2019,
p.8)
The claim that a small difference between time-like and space-like dimen-
sions, or more accurately, time-like and space-like directions, will not be enough
to ground the aesthetic value between normal and sideways music is hard to
parse. Indeed, Markosian offers no clear argument for why the asymmetry
between space and time, regarded as a pre-requisite to the grounding of an
aesthetic value of music, should be related to A-theoretic machinery, such as
an ontological distinction between the past, the present and the future, or a
flow of time. It seems that a local causal structure, or some laws of nature
distinguishing between space and time, could play the very same task. With
no further argument to the point that the conceptual machinery available to
the four-dimensionalist cannot achieve this goal, Markosian’s second argument
remains question-begging.
Markosian concludes the essay as follows:
One thing that The Argument from Sideways Music brings out is
the crucial importance of certain “tensed facts” (i.e. facts involving
A-properties), such as the fact that only this note is present. (Per-
haps it is equally important that that note is in the recent past, and
also that the next note is in the near future.) Another thing that
the argument brings out is the importance of the fact that there
is an essential, dynamic aspect to time. For it is literally the pas-
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sage through the sequence of the sounds (the ‘jerk and whoosh’ as
Williams (1951, 466) memorably puts it[...]) that gives music the
compelling quality it has. The dynamic aspect of music is essential
to its aesthetic value, and is directly tied to the dynamic aspect of
time. (Markosian, 2019, p.8)
None of this will satisfy a four-dimensionalist. The Argument from Sideways
Music only establishes that defective four-dimensionalism is false and that there
must exist in the actual spacetime structure a local distinction between space
and time. From this, it only follows that the disjunction of four-dimensionalism
rightly conceived and the A-theory must be true. Therefore, the dynamic aspect
of music, essential to its aesthetic value, is directly tied to the specific aspects
of the time directions that make them different from the spatial directions,
whatever those features and their origin turn out to be. Those specific features
of time, grounding the “dynamic” aspect of music do not need to be realised by
a “dynamic” time. (Note here the two different meanings of the word “dynamic”
in the sentence: it does not follow from the fact that a melody is dynamic by
being spread out in time, or more accurately, along a temporal direction, that
time must be dynamical in the metaphysical use of the term.)
The Argument from Sideways Music does not establish the falsity of four-
dimensionalism; it merely emphasises that defective four-dimensionalism—a
non-standard view inconsistent with virtually all spacetime theories to be found
in modern physics—is defective.7
7I want to thank Jiri Benovsky, Alberto Corti, Nick Huggett, Saakshi Dulani, Christian
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